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MARQUETTE
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XXIV FEBRUARY, 1940 NUMBER TWO
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS
GEORGE H. SEEFELD
YEAR 1840, A.D.
"The interference of the courts with the performance of the
ordinary duties of the executive departments of the government
would be productive of nothing but mischief, and we are satis-
fied that such power was never intended to be given them."'
YEAR 1936, A.D.
"Arbitrary power and the rule of the Constitution cannot
both exist.
"To escape assumptions of such power on the part of the
three primary departments of the government, is not enough.
Our institutions must be kept free from the appropriation of
unauthorized power by lesser agencies as well."2W ITHIN a span of 100 years, the attitude of American courts
toward review of the decisions of administrative bodies has
changed completely. The relatively simple structure of the administra-
tive branch of government in the early part of the 19th century en-
I Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, 516, 10 L.Ed. 559 (1840).
2 Jones v. S. E. C., 298 U.S. 1, 24, 56 Sup. Ct. 654, 661, 80 L.Ed. 1015 (1936).
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couraged the attitude of restraint adopted by the courts in reviewing
decisions of executive boards and officers. With the growth of admin-
istrative departments in complexity and power, the courts became more
and more concerned over the disappearance of the traditional separa-
tion of powers.
At present, the problem of the extent of court review of adminis-
trative decisions is receiving much serious attention. Any attempt to
solve the difficulty must include not only an understanding of the
nature and scope of administrative bodies as they exist today, but
also an evaluation of the reasons which prompted the formation of
existing rules of review. Therefore attention is first directed hastily to
the types and powers of administrative bodies. This will be followed
by a discussion of rules of review as developed in certain classes of
cases. On the basis of such study, a conclusion will be attempted.
I
NATURE OF EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
Legislators throughout the nation have seen fit to entrust admin-
istrative determinations to almost every conceivable type of administra-
tive body, particularly during the last fifty years.3 Executive officials
have been loaded with duties ranging from questions of changes in
personnel within their staff to matters affecting the life and health of
the general public.4 Boards and commissions of all sizes have sprung up
like mushrooms. These agencies have been utilized not only to formu-
late rules and regulations, but to investigate, prosecute, and adjudi-
cate claims. Thus the scope ranges from settling claims of the imme-
diate parties involved, to affecting rights of the entire consuming pub-
lic, and from dealing with completed events to establishing a course
of future conduct.5
Where administrative orders are given legal effect, they become
subject to judicial review. One type of statute provides for trial de
novo by the reviewing court. In others, the court may inquire into
3 For summaries of the growth of administrative agencies, see: Report of the
President's Committee on Administrative Management, With Special Studies
(1937) p. 207 ff.; James M. Landis, The Firing Line in the Law (1937) VrrIA.
SPEECHES OF THE DAY, vol. 3, p. 401; Felix Frankfurter, Democracy and the
Expert (1930) 146 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 649, 656.
For development of Federal Trade Commission and Interstate Commerce
Commission, see: Carl McFarland, Judicial Control of the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the Interstate Commerce Commission (1933) p. 39 ff. and 100 ff.,
and references therein cited.
4 For the extent of the influence of administrative agencies, see: Howard L.
Bevis, Administrative Commissions and the Administration of Justice (1928)
2 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 1.
5 Charles S. Hynemnan, Administrative Adjudication Analysis 1 (1936) 51 POL.
ScI. Q. 383, 387.
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both the law and fact, but solely on the basis of the certified record
of the administrative agency. In another, the facts are final, but the
courts may review the law. Finally, there is no review except possibly
on the question of jurisdiction.6
The work of these administrative agencies begins usually with con-
sideration of whether or not there is jurisdiction over the matter before
them. Because of the practical impossibility of wording a statute to
cover all conceivable fact situations, it becomes the duty of the admin-
istrative body to interpret the law. This may involve not only a care-
ful analysis of the statutes involved, but also a study of judicial deci-
sions. The largest portion of the work of these agencies, of course,
consists of fact-finding. Regardless of the apparently clear separation
of fact and law in some situations, it must be conceded that, in gen-
eral, the two are so closely interwoven as to be inseparable.7 Lastly,
the administrative bodies are forced to formulate policy where the
statutes are silent, and in this respect are engaged in the important
function of steering the course of public control of business.8
II
EVALUATION OF EXISTING R ULES OF REviEw
Because of the detailed body of law which has developed on judi-
cial review of administrative decisions, it will be impossible to consider
more than the most important principles which have been used. A
classification of the cases has been attempted to aid in discussing the
desirable extent of review, and in reaching a conclusion.
At the outset, it may be said that the courts have looked with
skepticism, if not jealousy, on the exercise by administrative bodies of
any power outside of fact-finding. The intensity of this feeling has
been developed in proportion to the public importance of the matters
falling within the jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
A. Determinations involving functional affairs and existence of
government.
In this group, consideration is given to cases dealing with discharge
of personnel, taxes, and immigration.
6 Ibid. p. 389; F. BLACHLY and M. OATMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LEGISLATION AND
ADJUDIcATION (1934) p. 179; E. B. Stason, Methods of Judicial Relief from
Adim. Action (1938) 12 U. oF CIN. L. REV. 227. Citation of statutory refer-
ence is deemed purposeless, since examples of the various types are so numer-
ous as to be without the uniqueness worthy of individual note.7 Hyneman, op. cit. supra, p. 410. For an astute distinction between law and
fact from the standpoint of function of administrative body and court see
JOaN DIcEINsON, ADMINIsTRATIVE JUSTICE AND SUPREMACY OF LAW (1927)
p. 168.
s For a complete discussion of the work of administrative agencies see Hyne-
man, op. cit. supra, p. 398 ff.
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1. Discharge of Personnel.
In line with the attitude expressed in the quotation with which this
study began, the courts decided at an early date that, in the absence
of statutory provision, they would not review the discharge by an
administrative officer of members of his department. 9 The legal justi-
fication for this principle was said to be that the power to appoint
included the power to remove when the tenure of office was not fixed.
With the passage of time this general doctrine was extended to cases
where the tenure was fixed by statute0 and to cases where the Presi-
dent alone discharged an executive officer who had been appointed by
him with the consent of the Senate."
The court has even gone so far as to hold that a general appraiser
might be removed by the President, for reasons other than those
enumerated in the statutes, without the consent of the Senate, where
no term of office was fixed by law.' 2
The case of Humphrey's Executor v. United States 3 brought the
power of removal to the forefront once more. In that case, the executor
of the estate of a former member of the Federal Trade Commission
sued for salary claimed to be due after the deceased had been removed
from the Federal Trade Commission by the President of the United
States. The Supreme Court, in answering certain questions certified to
it by the Court of Claims, said that the President had no power to
remove a member of an administrative body exercising legislative and
judicial functions for any reasons other than those specified in the
statutes. The duties of the Commission were said to be such that the
Commission must be free from executive control in accordance with
the theory of separation of powers. The Shurtleff and Myers cases
were distinguished on the ground that the officers involved in those
cases were subordinates in executive departments. 4
Between the Myers case on the one hand, and the Humphrey case
on the other, is a doubtful zone which future decisions will clarify.
It is apparent that the Supreme Court has set out to protect the auton-
omy of the independent regulatory commissions regardless of the ex-
tent to which it believes the decisions of such bodies should be subject
to judicial control. Along with this viewpoint the Court has evidently
decided to follow the long established principle of keeping out of the
9 Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 225, 230, 10 L.Ed. 136 (1839). Accord: Morris
Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 20 Sup. Ct. 574, 44 L.Ed. 774 (1900);
Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 21 Sup. Ct. 842, 45 L.Ed. 1162 (1901).
1o Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 17 Sup. Ct. 880, 42 L.Ed. 185 (1901).
11 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 21, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926).12 Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 23 Sup. Ct. 535, 47 L.Ed. 828 (1903).
"3295 U.S. 602, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 79 L.Ed. 611 (1935).
'4 Civil service laws do not change these rules much. If procedural requirements
are met, the court will not go behind the determination, ordering removal.
Dickinson, op. cit. supra, p. 266.
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internal affairs of the executive departments, particularly those in-
volving personnel. Both of these tendencies might be justified on the
separation of powers doctrine, as well as on other grounds. Practically,
since neither private property rights nor vested interests are at stake,
and operating efficiency demands free discretion in the executive to
mould his organization unhampered and undelayed, the court tries to
interfere as little as possible. 15
This judicial attitude has much to commend it. It is justified by
the doctrine of separation of powers; it allows free exercise of execu-
tive powers, without permitting an arbitrary invasion of individual
rights; it prevents long delays through lengthy court hearings and
further crowding of already over-crowded court calendars; it leaves
the designation of reasons for discharge within the control of the
administrative officers or of legislators where it properly belongs.
Because of the refusal of the Supreme Court to issue a writ of
mandamus in cases where discretion of an administrative officer is
involved,16 the question of discharge is usually presented in suits
started in the Court of Claims for unpaid salary. This Court is a
federal legislative court, the decisions of which may be reviewed on
certiorari to the Supreme Court.'" The Court may certify distinct
questions of law to the Supreme Court. Such a procedure satisfies
every demand of fairness and justice, so that any change in the present
extent of review would be undesirable.
2. Taxes.
In this class of cases the courts have been impressed with the neces-
sity of non-interference, perhaps more than in any other case. The rea-
sons for such an attitude seem to center about the theory that exercise
of the taxing power is essential to sovereignty"' and prompt payment
is vital to the very existence of government.' 9 Erroneous taxes result-
ing from honest mistakes in over-valuing property,20 honestly discrimi-
nating against taxpayer by unequal assessment,2' and purely ministerial
mistakes in preparing tax records, 22 are subject only to direct attack.
On the other hand, if there is fraud23 or mistake in assessing or listing
15 Dickinson, op. cit. supra, p. 265.
16 See Ex parte Hennen, supra note 9.
17 For description see Wilbur G. Katz, Federal Legislative Courts (1930) 43
HARV. L. REv. 894, and Blachly & Oatman, op. cit. supra, p. 128.
'
8 Loan Ass'n. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 663, 22 L.Ed. 455 (1874).
19 Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 20 L.Ed. 65 (1871).
20 Bartlett v. Kane, 16 How. 263, 14 L.Ed. 931 (1853); Hilton v. Merritt, 110
U.S. 97, 3 Sup. Ct. 548, 28 L.Ed. 83 (1883) ; Dickinson, op cit. supra, p. 271.2
1 Mercantile Nat. Bank of N. Y. v. The Mayor, 172 N.Y. 35, 64 N.E. 756 (1902);
People v. Hibernian Banking Ass'n., 245 Ill. 522, 92 N.E. 305 (1910).
22 E. B. Stason, Judicial Review of Tax Errors (1929) 28 MicH. L. Rzv. 637.
23 Pac. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Dalton, 119 Cal. 604, 51 Pac. 1072 (1898).
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property for taxation, the court will review on collateral attack.24
Generally, the administrative remedies need not be exhausted in the
second group of cases just discussed, but there is some authority to
the contrary.25 Because of the necessity of prompt assessment and
collection, the courts have applied liberal rules of due process as far
as notice and hearing are concerned. No personal notice of assessment
is necessary,26 but there must be notice and opportunity to be heard
at some stage of the collection process.2 7
Tax questions usually involve highly technical details which the
courts are ill-equipped to consider. When this fact is coupled with the
necessity for prompt decision, it is apparent that there is justification
for the attitude of non-interference which has been adopted. But the
danger of inadequate protection of the taxpayer's rights looms large
in this type of case. Very often the notice to which the taxpayer is
entitled is a mere technical gesture which does not come to his atten-
tion.2 8 If such notice is adequate to apprise the taxpayer of his rights,2 9
and if adequate administrative appeals are provided, the balance swings
in favor of judicial review as it exists at present.30 The remedy for
any apparent hardship on the taxpayer lies in the proper selection of
administrative officials rather than judicial review.
3. Immigration Cases.
Like the tax cases, the courts have considered administrative con-
trol over aliens as going directly to the existence and safety of govern-
ment and thus inherent in sovereignty.31 All other considerations are
to be subordinated. Furthermore, the power is not restricted by treaty.3 2
On the basis of such considerations, the courts have generally refused
to review a decision because it was erroneous.33 However, if it was
24 Cincinnati Southern Ry. v. Guenther, 19 Fed. 395 (E.D. Tenn. 1884); John-
son v. Wells Fargo & Co., 239 U.S. 234, 36 Sup. Ct. 62, 60 L.Ed. 463 (1915);
Stason, op cit., p 646.
25 First Nat. Bank of Greeley v. Board of County Commissioners, 264 U.S. 450,
44 Sup. Ct. 385, 68 L.Ed. 784 (1924). If administrative remedy is futile, one
need not exhaust administrative appeals. Montana Nat. Bank v. Yellow-
stone Co., 276 U.S. 499, 48 Sup. Ct. 331, 72 L.Ed. 673 (1928).
26 Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 54 Sup. Ct. 743, 17 L.Ed. 1323 (1934);
Merchants Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U.S. 461, 17 Sup. Ct. 829, 42 L.Ed. 236
(1897).27Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U.S. 23, 35 Sup. Ct. 2, 59 L.Ed. 105 (1914).
28 Stason, op. cit. p. 664.
29 H. J. S., The Necessity of Notice and Heading in Administrative Determina-
tion (1931) U. OF PA. L. REv. 96-105.30 Dickinson believes that the court should review the exercise of discretion of
petty tax officials in all cases not involving matters calling for expert or
technical judgments of fact. See Dickinson, op. cit. supra, p. 270.
sl United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 24 Sup. Ct. 719, 48
L.Ed. 979 (1904).
32 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 9 Sup. Ct. 623, 32 L.Ed. 1068(1889).
3aDharandas Tulsidas v. Insular Collector of Customs, 262 U.S. 258, 43 Sup.
Ct. 586, 67 L.Ed. 969 (1923).
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rendered without any substantial evidence to support it, the court will
reverse it as being arbitrary and unreasonable.34 In this class of cases
the courts have preserved the requirements of due process by ruling
that there must be an opportunity for a fair hearing, 5 though the pro-
cedure and rules of evidence applicable in a law court need not be
followed. 36 The trend of the cases is toward an insistence upon greater
procedural safeguards.37 The courts have also insisted upon the exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies before habeas corpus proceedings will
be permitted.38
In regard to questions of fact and law, the courts have refused
to review the first39 but will review the second.40 The refusal to review
determinations of fact has been carried even to jurisdictional facts in
exclusion cases 41 though not in expulsion cases.
42
During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1937, 50,244 immigrants
came to the United States43 and 8,829 were deported.4 4 Compared to
the decade ending in 1930, this is a small annual figure but it is large
enough to prove conclusively that control of aliens cannot be assumed
by the courts. Furthermore, the policy of non-interference which the
courts are apparently following is amply justified by the reasons which
have heretofore been pointed out.45 The distinction between "fact"
and "jurisdictional fact" was shown to be flexible enough to permit
its use in one type of case and not in another.
B. Determinations involving governmental grants and services.
The cases in this class fall into three divisions-land grants, pen-
sions, and postal decisions.
1. Land Grants.
Here the power-renouncing attitude of the courts has found its
fullest expression. Among the reasons assigned are that Congress has
exclusive power over the public domain by the Constitution, that Con-
34 Lisotta v. United States, 3 F. (2d) 108 (1924); Tillinghast v. Wong Wing,
33 Fed. (2d) 290 (1928).
35 Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 28 Sup. Ct. 201, 52 L.Ed. 369 (1908).3 6 M oy Said Ching v. Tillinghast, 21 F. (2d) 810 (1927).
37 Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 40 Sup. Ct. 566, 64 L.Ed. 1010 (1920);
Dickinson, op. cit. supra, p. 295.
38 United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 24 Sup. Ct. 621, 48 L.Ed. 917 (1904).
39 Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 15 Sup. Ct. 967, 39 L.Ed.
1082 (1895).
40 Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1, 24 Sup. Ct. 177, 48 L.Ed. 317 (1904).
41United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644, 49 L.Ed. 1040 (1905).
42 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 42 Sup. Ct. 492, 66 L.Ed. 938 (1922).
13 TWENTY-FIFrH ANNUAL REPORT (Secretary of Labor 1937) p. 83.
&4 Ibid., p. 89.
65 Dickinson suggests that questions of citizenship be tried by a jury, and that
applicant be permitted to make a prima facie case by affidavits of two or
more domiciled citizens not of his own race. See Dickinson, op. cit. supra., p.
296.
It is submitted that such a plan would increase delays, uncertainties and
costs without adding appreciable advantages.
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gress has constituted the Land Department as a special tribunal, that
the power to dispose of and survey public lands belongs exclusively to
the political department of government, that acts of the Land Depart-
ment are discretionary until the right to the land is vested in the
applicant, 46 and lastly the pragmatic reason that expediency requires
non-interference. 47 Like the tax cases, the courts have refused to
upset an erroneous decision by injunction or mandamus 48 unless there
is mistake, fraud or imposition 49 proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Also, if the decision is clearly beyond the power of the officers, it will
be subject to court review.5 0
Here too, law and fact has been made a basis for determining
whether the decision will be scrutinized by the courts.51 Great weight
will be given to the administrative construction of questions of law.52
In summary, the effect of the decisions is that the courts refuse
to treat as matters for the application of legal rules, or lay down such
rules to govern, many of the details of procedure, and even of classi-
fication and interpretation which they properly prefer to regard as
the subject matter for a body of technical administrative officers. This
group of cases emphasizes that what are questions of law is properly
a matter for the courts to determine depending on the desirability or
feasibility of establishing fixed rules of permanent and universal appli-
cation.53 They may be characterized as involving privileges rather than
fundamental rights, and in the absence of arbitrary or fraudulent
favoritism, there is no good reason for court interference.
2. Pensions.
The history of the pension cases is very similar to that of the land
cases just considered. Non-review of administrative decisions has been
justified by stressing the bounty characteristic54 and the absence of a
46 See Forrest R. Black, The "Jurisdictional Fact" Theory and Administrative
Finality (1937) 22 CORN. L. Q. 515, 517-518.
4 St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 26 L.Ed. 875 (1881).
48 United States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.S. 316, 23 Sup. Ct.
698, 47 L.Ed. 1073 (1903).
49 Germania Iron Co. v. United States, (mistake) 165 U.S. 379, 17 Sup. Ct. 337,
41 L.Ed. 754 (1897) ; Williams v. United States, (fraud) "138 U.S. 514, 11 Sup.
Ct. 457, 34 L.Ed. 1026 (1890) ; see United States ex rel. Hall v. Payne, 254
U.S. 343, 41 Sup. Ct. 131, 65 L.Ed. 695 (1920). It has been held that perjured
testimony is not sufficient to invoke equitable aid of the courts. Steel v. St.
Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 106 U.S. 447, 1 Sup. Ct. 389, 27 L.Ed. 226
(1882).
50 Santa Fe Pac. R. R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U.S. 197, 42 Sup. Ct. 466, 66 L.Ed. 696
(1922).
51 Quinby v. Conlan, 104 U.S. 420, 26 L.Ed. 800 (1882) ; Ross v. Day, 232 U.S.
110, 34 Sup. Ct. 233, 58 L.Ed. 528 (1914).
52 Heath v. Wallace, 138 U.S. 573, 11 Sup. Ct. 380, 34 L.Ed. 1063 (1891)
United States ex rel. Ness v. Fisher, 223 U.S. 683, 32 Sup. Ct. 356, 56 L.Ed.
610 (1912).
53 Dickinson, op. cit. supra, p. 287.
54 Walton v. Cotton, 19 How. 355, 15 L.Ed. 658 (1856).
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vested right in the pension.55 Findings of fact are conclusive, though
equity will relieve for fraud if proved beyond a reasonable doubt.5"
An arbitrary or capricious finding will be set aside, the procedure will
be examined, and questions of law will be reviewed. 57
Comments similar to those expressed about land cases are applicable
to this type of case.
3. Postal Decisions.
The sale of governmental services, of which the postal service is
an outstanding example, has not been interfered with by the courts,
on the grounds that this activity is a privilege, offered by the govern-
ment, which it is not obligated to supply and therefore may be limited
as the government may desire.58 The action of the Postmaster-General
is presumed to be correct unless shown to be tainted with fraud,
absolutely unlawful, clearly outside the statute, or perhaps clearly,
palpably and obviously wrong.59 Even on some questions of law, the
action of the Post-Office Department is final unless clearly erroneous, 60
and questions of fact are conclusive. 61
A danger lurks in this group of cases because of the restraint which
the courts have exercised, particularly in reviewing fraud orders of
the Postmaster-General. The rule in such cases is that the court will
not interfere unless clearly of the opinion that the Postmaster-General
was wrong.62 This attitude of the courts results in constituting the
Postmaster-General the universal censor63 and is an example of the
possibility of serious interference with individual rights of property
and liberty which may develop from the unhampered extension of
monopolistic control of public services.64 To prevent this tendency from
expanding unduly, a policy of review similar to that in the public
utility cases should be adopted.
55 United States v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 9 Sup. Ct. 12, 32 L.Ed. 354 (1888).
56 Lalone v. United States, 164 U.S. 255, 17 Sup. Ct. 74, 41 L.Ed. 425 (1896).
5 See Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167, 56 Sup. Ct. 400, 80 L.Ed. 391
(1936).
58 Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 789, 48 L.Ed. 1092
(1904). For general discussion see H. Parker Sharp, Conclusive Administra-
tive Devisions (1935) 5 IND. L. J. 563.
-9 See Hoover v. McChesney, 81 Fed. 472 (1897).
60 Bates & Guild v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 24 Sup. Ct. 595, 48 L.Ed. 494 (1904);
Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U.S. 53, 33 Sup. Ct. 6, 57 L.Ed. 119 (1912); But
see American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 23 Sup.
Ct. 33, 47 L.Ed. 90 (1902) ; Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88, 24 Sup. Ct. 590,
48 L.Ed. 888 (1904).6 1 Leach v. Carlisle, 258 U.S. 138, 42 Sup. Ct. 227, 66 L.Ed. 511 (1921).
62 United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407, 41 Sup. Ct. 352, 65 L.Ed. 704 (1921).
63 See dissent in Burleson case, supra, at p. 423.
64 See comment on such danger: E. FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PER-
SONS AND PROPERTY (1928) p. 442; Dickinson, op. cit. supra, p. 301.
In the case of municipal public services, more judicial control has been
exercised on the ground that the municipality in supplying such service is
acting in the capacity of a private corporation. Dickinson, supra, p. 302.
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C. Determinations in the exercise of police power.
This classification includes, among others, rulings of commissions,
boards and officers on health, welfare, and safety regulations, conserva-
tion measures, issuance of licenses, and industrial accidents.
The courts are hopelessly confused on the extent of review in
these cases, and it will be impossible to consider more than a few
general principles. The weight of the more recent authority in nuisance
cases is that an administrative official will not be allowed to conclude
the owner upon the question of existence of a nuisance.6 5 This is
especially true if the need for haste and summary action is not com-
pelling. Abatement power may be delegated, but the officer acts at his
peril if there is no previous determination by due process of law that
a nuisance exists.68
The courts have gone so far as to declare that a hearing was
unnecessary where the commission issued an order to cease and desist
discharging sawdust into a stream.6 7
Where the granting of a license requires expert knowledge, deter-
minations of mixed question of fact and law have been held final.6 s
In order to suggest a desirable extent of review in this group of
cases, further subdividing must be done. A basis for classification
which is very suitable 9 is whether expert knowledge and summary
action are required. Determinations which require expert knowledge
but not summary action, such as granting of licenses to practice techni-
cal occupations, condemnation of drugs and non-perishable foods, etc.,
should not be reviewed by the courts except when arbitrary or abso-
lutely unreasonable. Every reason for administrative regulation rather
than court action is found in this type of activity. The same reason-
ing may be applied to cases which require summary action, such as
isolation of contagiously diseased persons and destruction of perish-
able food. On the other hand, those decisions of administrative bodies
which require neither expert knowledge nor summary action ought
to be subject to review. Such decisions are usually in the jurisdiction
of petty officials and the likelihood of government oppression is very
great.70 The considerations of expert knowledge and summary action,
which overshadowed this point in the first two groups of cases, are
65 F. R. Black, op. cit. supra, p. 538; Thomas Reed Powell, Administrative Exer-
cise of the Police Power (1911) 24 HARv. L. REv. 333, 339.
66 Black, supra, p. 538.
67 Commonwealth v. Sisson, 189 Mass. 246, 75 N.E. 622, 1 L.R.A. (N.s.) 752
(1905). Dickinson believes this case strikes down both the right and possibility
of review. Dickinson, op. cit. supra, p. 61.
68 Granville v. Gregory, 83 Mo. 123 (1884).
69 See Dickinson, op. cit. supra, p. 253 ff.
To Ibid. p. 256.
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absent here. If notice and opportunity to be heard are assured in every
case, there is a large measure of control, even in the first two groups.71
It is difficult to summarize the attitude of the courts on review of
decisions of industrial accident boards, but a few of the significant
principles developed in these cases can be pointed out. Questions of
due process seemed particularly important in this class of cases and a
number of points developed by the courts include the principles that
the right to a jury trial is not essential,7 2 technical rules of evidence and
procedure may be inapplicable, 73 and that the right of appeal from an
administrative tribunal to the courts is not a requirement of due
process,74 providing proper notice and opportunity to be heard are
given at primary hearing. In general the statutes permit court review
on appeal.7 5 However, the extent of the review cannot be determined
from the language of the statutes alone. It has been found that in some
states where judicial review is applied to both law and fact, the courts
are reluctant to reverse the administrative finding except in cases of
necessity.78 In some states where the review of facts is not expressly
required, the courts limit themselves primarily to issues of law.77
Finally, in states where administrative determinations of fact are made
final, the courts always have the opportunity to discover issues of law,
or to determine that the administrative finding has no support in the
evidence."' Despite much argument to the contrary the courts are still
maintaining a right to review "jurisdictional" facts in all cases.70
The extent of variance in the administrative machinery for dealing
with these cases is hardly exceeded in any other part of the adminis-
trative field. After careful study in New York, the National Industrial
Conference Board concluded that under conditions actually existing in
the United States, as well as constitutional safeguards which should be
preserved, it is desirable to have judicial review of administrative
determinations of this type of claim. 0 It is not intended that every
71 Adequate notice and hearing are said to be among the most effective safe-
guards against gross errors of judgment, over-zealous extensions of authority,
arbitrariness, oppression, and disregard of long-established and socially bene-
ficial private rights. H. J. S., supra, note 29.72 Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 37 Sup. Ct. 255, 61 L.Ed. 678 (1917).
73 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932).
74 Ohio v. Akron Park District, 281 U.S. 74, 50 Sup. Ct. 228, 74 L.Ed. 710 (1930).
Even the right to stipulate away any resort to the courts does not render
Workmen's Compensation Law void. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133
N.W. 209, 37 L.R.A. (N.s.) 489 (1911).75 WALTER F. DODD, ADmmISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COmENSATiON (1936) p.
401. See also 5 RocKY MOUNTAIN L. REv. 17.
76 Dodd, op. cit. supra, p. 381 and notes thereto.
77 Ibid. p. 381.
78 Ibid.
79 Crowell v. Benson, supra, note 73. See powerful dissent of Brandeis, p. 65 ff.,
and comment: 80 U. of PA. L. REv. 1055, 41 YALE L. J. 1037, 46 HARv. L. REv.
478.
so THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PROBLEM IN NEW YORK STATE (1927) p. 43.
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decision should be carried to the courts, but general oversight to pre-
vent arbitrary and discriminatory rulings, and to provide an inde-
pendent agency for the interpretation of Compensation Acts, is desir-
able."'
The extent of court review should not be so great as to permit
trial de novo. Such review is open to all the objections that are applied
to court administration in the first instance. It is cumbersome and
expensive; it adds to the lack of uniformity, s 2 and affords opportunity
to withhold testimony on the administrative hearing which is later pre-
sented in the court hearing.83 Under such circumstances the decisions
of experts on questions of fact lose most of their value and seriously
endanger adequate protection of the claimants' rights. s4
The experience of various states and analysis of reported decisions
lead one to the conclusion that finality of fact-determination in com-
pensation proceedings is more desirable and leads to justice, prompt-
ness, and more efficient administration.8 5
The plan of review which has worked most satisfactorily for indus-
trial accident cases is that adopted in Wisconsin and New York. In
Wisconsin the case is originally heard by an examiner, with appeal
on all questions to the Industrial Commission. If either party is dis-
satisfied with the decision of the Board, an action may be started
against the Commission in a special circuit court by summons and
complaint setting forth the grounds for review. On such review the
findings of fact are conclusive, but the court may review the evidence
to determine if the Commission acted within its powers, if the order or
award was procured by fraud, or if the findings of fact support the
order or award. Final appeal may be taken to the State Supreme
Court. 6
s1 Ibid. p. 43.
The board or commission should be entitled to rely upon its own experi-
ence derived from previous decisions. W. H. Pillsbury, Review of Decisions
of Administrative Tribunals-Industrial Accident Commission (1931) 19 CALIF.
L. REv. 286.
82 A jury trial would increase this disadvantage tremendously. In neither Ohio
nor Maryland has the jury system proved successful on judicial review. The
Governor's Interim Committee on Workmens' Compensation in Oregon said
appeal to the jury on questions of fact has resulted in an unbalanced distribu-
tion of compensation benefits. REPORT, GOVERNOR'S INTERIM COMMITTEE, (1931).
83 Dodd, op. cit. supra, p. 370.
84 The inferential requirement by the court of trial de novo in Crowell v. Ben-
son, supra, note 73, cannot be sustained on ground of policy. Felix S. Wahr-
haftig, Judicial Review of Administrative Findings on Findamental or Juris-
dictional Facts (1933) 21 CALIF. L. REv. 266, 274.
85 Dodd, op. cit. supra, p. 383.
86 Wis. STATS. (1937) §§ 102.23-25. See also Ray A. Brown, Administration of
Workmen's Compensation, 10 Wis. L. REv. 345. For New York procedure
see CAHILLS CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEw YORK (1930), Chapter 66, and par-
ticularly §§ 20 to 23 inclusive.
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Recently, there has been a strong tendency to invest officers and
boards with powers to regulate businesses which are closely connected
with the health and welfare of the public. This tendency was extended
to an attempt to regulate all business by the N.I.R.A. on the grounds
that an emergency existed which demanded such regulation. The pri-
mary legal question raised through this movement was the extent to
which legislative power might be delegated. For example, in those states
where boards and commissions were given power to fix the minimum
and maximum prices for milk, the courts have refused to interfere,
saying there has been no unlawful delegation of legislative power.'
7
If the legislature has established standards, it may delegate authority
to a board or officer to make rules and regulations concerning the
application of such standards, the reasonable variations therefrom,""
and to determine whether the standard applies in such case. 9 On the
other hand, if the legislature does not set out standards, there is
unlawful delegation of power to administrative bodies if they are
permitted to make rules and regulations." The theory is that it is a
wholesome and necessary principle for an administrative agency to be
limited to making rules and regulations subordinate to and in accord-
ance with the framework of policy defined by the legislature.91
Though consideration of the N.I.R.A. does not fall under the
present heading, but rather under another class of cases to be dis-
cussed later, it is inserted here because of its importance in any dis-
cussion of the doctrine of delegation of powers.
The non-delegability of powers is really a corollary of the doctrine
of separation of powers, and has been revived to support efforts to
resist legislative grant of authority to administrative agencies.92 Until
1935, it had been used only occasionally since our earliest history suc-
cessfully to attack the grant of administrative powers.8 3 It has served
a purpose since that year of justifying a need for legislative standards
for administrative action. There is some doubt as to the value of such
standards,94 but it may be said that until the pressure of legislative work
becomes overwhelming and until experience justifies increased confi-
87 Nebbia v. N. Y., 291 U.S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 7 L.Ed. 940 (1934); High-
land Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 57 Sup. Ct. 549, 81 L.Ed. 835 (1937).88 Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570, 54 Sup. Ct 277, 78 L.Ed. 505
(1934) ; United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elev. Co., 287 U.S. 77, 53 Sup.
Ct. 42, 77 L.Ed. 175 (1932); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 52 Sup. Ct.
581, 76 L.Ed. 1167 (1932).89 Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183, 57 Sup. Ct. 691 (1937).
90 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446
(1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct.
837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935).91 Panama Refining Co. v. Amazon Petroleum Corp. supra, note 90.
92 McFarland, op. cit. supra. p. 7 ff.
9 3 JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) p. 50.
94 Ibid., p. 51 ff.
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dence in administrative agencies, there is value in the requirement of
such standards.
D. Determinations involving supervision of business.
In some respects the classification adopted for this study breaks
down at this point, but no grouping of cases will satisfy every demand
because of the wide variance in types of administrative agencies.
Though no sub-classification will be attempted, the agencies might
be grouped under the heads of policing and regulatory bodies. Exam-
ples of the first are the Federal Trade Commission and National Labor
Relations Board, the duties of which are like those of a business court.
The second group is represented by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion as the most outstanding example.
Because of the great number of administrative bodies which fall
in this group, and the varied principles which have been developed,
only the most significant judicial rules of review of the decisions of the
most representative agencies will be considered.
No better illustrations of the futility of trying to separate questions
of fact from questions of law can be found than in this group of cases.
Although the findings of fact of the Federal Trade Commission are
conclusive if supported by the testimony, 95 the court has not hesitated
to substitute its own opinions for those of the Commissioners." Every
phase of the proceedings and every part of the record has been exam-
ined when a party sought review of an order, or the Commission
applied to the courts for enforcement.9 7 The Supreme Court has
further announced that what constitutes "unfair method of competi-
tion" is a question for the courts and not the Commission." The impli-
cation is that the statute has set up merely a legal standard, rather
than a standard dependent upon expert practical judgment. The result
is that the Commission is a fact-finding body in a very limited sense
of determining conclusively whether physical facts exist or not.99
It was not until 1912 that the Supreme Court brought the doctrine
of divisibility of law and fact into public utility law.100 The attitude of
9538 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45.
96 G. C. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1924) p. 92 ff. However,
in 1934 the Supreme Court held that when the Commission had chosen certain "
inferences from among uncertain and conflicting ones in a case built upon
opinions of experts, the Court would not interfere. Federal Trade Commission
v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 54 Sup. Ct. 315, 78 L.Ed. 655 (1934).
Even jurisdictional facts may be conclusive. Federal Trade Commission v.
Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 53 Sup. Ct. 335, 77 L.Ed. 706 (1933).
9 McFarland, op. cit. supra, p. 93. See International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm., 280 U.S. 291, 50 Sup. Ct. 89, 74 L.Ed. 431 (1930) in which case the
Court substituted its own interpretation of the evidence.
98 Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 40 Sup. Ct. 572, 64 L.Ed.
993 (1920).
99 Henderson, op. cit. supra, p. 102.
100 Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 222 U.S. 541, 32
Sup. Ct. 108, 56 L.Ed. 308 (1912).
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the Court on the extent of review had previously been stated as fol-
lows: The Court will consider (a) all relevant questions of constitu-
tional power or right, (b) all pertinent questions as to whether the
administrative order is within the scope of delegated authority, and
(c) whether the order in substance is within the delegated power
regardless of the form.1 1 The new distinction was developed in later
cases as follows: A pure finding of fact would not be set aside unless
there was no substantial evidence to support it.10 2 In reparation cases
much less weight has been given to the findings than in non-reparation
cases. 03 In considering the reasonableness of rates, the courts have
decided that there must be an independent judicial determination of
the facts relating to value. 10 4 Such facts were called "jurisdictional,"
and such holding is part of the present tendency of the courts to review
findings of "constitutional" and "jurisdictional" facts. 05
Outside of the tendency just discussed, the courts have followed
a hands-off policy, particularly in railway cases, and in adopting the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction of the Commission,' as well as the
doctrine of non-review of refusals by the Commission to act. 0 7 Of
course, questions of law have been open to review at all times. 08
At the present time the chief problem with which the courts are
concerned, as regards decisions of independent regulatory bodies, is
101 Interstate Commerce Comm. v. III. Cent. Ry., 215 U.S. 452, 30 Sup. Ct. 155,
54 L.Ed. 280 (1910). Compare Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond &
Mtge. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 53 Sup. Ct. 627, 77 L.Ed. 1166 (1933).
102 United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 235 U.S. 314, 35 Sup. Ct.
113, 59 L.Ed. 245 (1914); Georgia Public Service Comm. v. United States,
283 U.S. 765, 51 Sup. Ct. 619, 75 L.Ed. 1397 (1931). Accord: Swayne & Hoyt
Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 57 Sup. Ct. 478, 81 L.Ed. 659 (1937);
Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426, 56 Sup. Ct. 824, 80 L.Ed. 1257 (1936).
103 A. M. Tollefson, Judicial Review of the Decisions of the Interstate Conmnerce
Commission (1937) 11 MINN. L. REv. 506.
Reparation cases: Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Weber, 257 U.S. 85, 42 Sup.
Ct. 18, 66 L.Ed. 141 (1921).
Non-reparation cases: United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co.,
supra, note 102; Manufacturers' R. R. Co. v. United States, 246 U.S. 457,
38 Sup. Ct. 383, 62 L.Ed. 831 (1913).
104 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527,
64 L.Ed. 908 (1920). See also: United States v. Idaho, 298 U.S. 105, 56 Sup.
Ct. 690, 80 L.Ed. 1070 (1936).
105 Crowell v. Benson, supra, note 73. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 38, 56 Sup. Ct. 720, 80 L.Ed. 1033 (1936).
The above two cases also required trial de novo on jurisdictional and
constitutional facts. Compare Manufacturers' R. R. Co. v, United States,
supra, note 103, which required all pertinent evidence to be submitted to the
administrative agency in the first instance.
108 Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 Sup.
Ct. 350, 51 L.Ed. 553 (1907).
107 Interstate Commerce Comm. v. United States, 289 U.S. 385, 53 Sup. Ct 607,
77 L. Ed. 1273 (1933).
108 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States, 295 U.S. 193, 55 Sup.
Ct. 748, 79 L.Ed. 1382 (1935).
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whether or not the procedural steps satisfy the demands of due
process.10 9
The distinction between law and fact has served no purpose except
perhaps to indicate the complete irrationality of the courts' explanation
of the duties of the administrative bodies. 10 The necessity for judicial
determination of value in the Ben Avon case conflicts with the ruling
that valuations of property for tax purposes shall be final if supported
by the evidence. The doctrine of review of jurisdictional facts found in
Crowell v. Benson and deportation cases conflicts with the rule that
findings of fact on citizenship in alien exclusion cases and on facts in
general in other administrative cases shall be final."' The result of
the Ben Avon case, when coupled with the insistence that reproduction
cost must be given fair consideration in determining value, has been
to prolong administrative proceedings interminably. The Crowell case
is also a serious blow to the efficiency of the administration of work-
mens' compensation legislation.
The problem of review of the decisions of the independent regula-
tory commissions has centered about the fundamental difference be-
tween governmental administration and the task of adjudication. The
Federal Trade Commission, for instance, combines the duties of inves-
tigator, prosecutor, and judge. Because of the press of these varied
duties, the adjudication and delimitation of rights is necessarily sec-
ondary. Realization of this fact may account in part for the close
supervision which the courts have exercised over decisions of the Com-
mission, a supervision like that of a higher court over a lower one." 2
Substantially the same difficulties are characteristic of the Interstate
Commerce Commission and other independent regulatory bodies. In
these agencies, however, there is the added requisite of technical quali-
fications for the personnel. This added fact is justification for the
greater restraint which the courts have exercised when asked to review.
109 Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm. of Ohio, 301 U.S. 292,
57 Sup. Ct. 724, 81 L.Ed. 1093 (1937) ; Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
Neb. State Ry. Comm., 297 U.S. 471, 56 Sup. Ct. 536, 80 L.Ed. 810 (1938);
National Labor Relations Board v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co., 98 F. (2d) 16
(1938); Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-Building Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 Sup. Ct.
459, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938); A. H. Feller, Administrative Justice (1938) 27
SURVEY GRAPHic 494, 496.
110 Robert M. Cooper, Administrative Justice and Role of Discretion (1938) 47
YALE L. J. 577, 590.
The difficulty of separating law and fact weighs heavily against any divi-
sion of administrative bodies into separate law and fact-finding units.
1 See general discussion: James M. Landis, Administrative Policies and the
Courts (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 519, 522. Cf. explanation of Justice Brandeis
in Crowell v. Benson, supra, note 73.
112 There is a distinct feeling that such supervision is necessary and beneficial.
Gilbert H. Montague, Enforcenvent of Anti-Trust Laws by the Courts or a
Commission (1930) 147 ANNALS 179; see also Frank B. Fox, What About
Administrative Tribunals (1935) 21 A.B.A.J. 876.
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The real problem of review, as far as the independent regulatory
commissions are concerned, is to what agency shall be left the develop-
ment of legal rules under the prevailing theory of supremacy of the
law, and that question will now be discussed generally in the conclusion.
III
CONCLUSION
It must be apparent from the foregoing discussion that administra-
tive law in this country has been compelled to crowd its way into a
legal system in which no place had been prepared for it. Furthermore,
it has been superimposed upon doctrines of fundamental law which
are diametrically opposed in theory. Our Constitution sought to estab-
lish a separation of powers, which, if carried to its logical limits, would
leave no place for most of the administrative agencies as they exist
today."13 Through the pressure of insistent demand for administrative
assistance in disposing of the ever-growing mass of governmental
duties, the courts were forced to find a place for such agencies. With
customary ingenuity in interpreting the Constitution, judges were able
to develop sufficient legal reasons for permitting such bodies to exist.
Conceding the necessity for the existence of administrative agencies,
and for their continued growth, the balance of power between the
judiciary and the administrative becomes of prime importance. Some-
where between the Scylla of complete judicial control and the Charyb-
dis of unhampered administrative dominance lies the answer to our
problem. The relegation of the administrative to a mere investigative
clerkship means the assumption of a fatally over-powering mass of
duties by the courts. On the other hand, the enforced withdrawal of
judicial attention means the supremacy of purely political power.
Any~answer will reflect in part the philosophy of law to which the
replier adheres. One who believes in the "supremacy of law" or "rule
of law" propounded by Dicey in 1885 1 will advocate a trial de novo
on every question. Those who agree with the restatement of that rule
made by Justice Brandeis will be satisfied if court review is limited to
inquiry whether an erroneous rule of law was applied, and whether the
administrative proceeding was conducted regularly."15
Conceding the advisability of continuing to believe in the supremacy
of law, the question still remains as to its practical meaning as far as
division in scope of duties between administrative and judiciary is con-
cerned. Traditionally, the courts have been the "law-givers." "Law"
113 State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220
N.W. 929 (1928).
114 DicEY, LAW OF THE CONSnr TIoN (8th ed. 1923), p. 183.
:1
5 See Statement in St. Joseph Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84,
56 Sup. Ct. 720, 740, 80 L.Ed. 1033 (1936).
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has meant the rules administered and developed by the courts.11 In the
last analysis, the judiciary still remains the most expert body for the
development of general rules of human conduct.
Thus, however far from judicial control the independence of admin-
istrative bodies is permitted to go, there is a limit which is reached
before such bodies are completely immunized from the courts. As long
as this country continues under the present constitutional form of
government, the final arbiter of the rights and privileges of life and
liberty, as well as the protector of property, will be the courts. 1 17
Whether or not existing courts are satisfactory for these purposes is
beside the point.'"
Aside from the constitutional reasons which compel this conclusion
there are others which sustain it. Not the least of these is the difficulty
inherent in administrative bodies of insuring justice. The administrative
officers and boards often combine legislative, judicial, and executive
functions. In making regulations and orders, they are exercising the
first; in deciding cases, they are operating under the second; and in
enforcing their judgments or decisions, they are carrying out the
third."9
In forming regulations and administrative orders, they may be sub-
ject to all the political pressures which besiege legislative bodies on
every hand. In deciding cases, such pressures as well as the control of
executive officers must be eliminated. On the other hand, the enforce-
ment of orders and regulations falls naturally under the control of
the executive department. In addition it is felt that some administra-
tive bodies are created as militant crusaders to carry out certain social
and economic changes advocated by particular groups.12 1 Also, the
necessity of some boards and commissions to act both as prosecutor and
judge is a dangerous hindrance to the exercise of the proper judicial
attitude.
The personnel of many administrative agencies consists of political
appointees, who may or may not be qualified to deal with technical
details impartially. Delegation of duties to deputies further adds to the
dangers by separating performance of duties from responsibility.
16 LANDIS, ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND THE COURTS, Op. Cit. supra, note 111.
'117 See Carl McFarland, Administrative Agencies in Governinent and the Effect
Thereon of Constitutional Limitations (1934) 20 A.B.A, 612.
118 Several plans to remodel the court system have been suggested of which the
most outstanding is the plan of the Special Committee on Administrative
Law of the A. B. A. (1936), 61 A. B. A. 720. See also a study of the
English System in REPORT OF THE COMmrrrEE ON MINISTERS' PowER, LONDON
(1932).
"9 0. R. McGuire, Administrative Lawmaking (1936) 185 ANNALS 83.
120 See comment of Raymond Moley on the A. A. A. and Wagner Acts, Power
(1938) 11 NEWSWEEK 40. R. L. Lund, Labor Organizing by the Congress and
Lawmaking by the Labor Board (1935) 78 ANNALS 106.
[Vol. 24
1940] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 79
Under the circumstances just outlined, if individual rights are to
be protected, some separate authority, judicial in its nature, must test
the conformity of administrative action with the laws or superior rules
and regulations safeguarding rights, forms, and procedure. 21 It is not
enough that the administrative body is subject to control by legisla-
tures, because it is impossible for the latter to pass laws which will
cover every circumstance. 122 The most that can be expected of legisla-
tures is the establishment of clear basic principles, standards, and cri-
teria within the limits of which the administrative bodies are required
to act.'
2
Let us turn back at this point to the quotation which headed this
study. The idea there expressed is permeated with the laissez faire
philosophy of the era in which it was uttered. It was conditioned upon
a governmental structure which did not include the "self-willed" admin-
istrative bodies which seek to plan the legal relationships of American
citizens today. It was occasioned by questioned use of the common law
remedies of mandamus and injunction. The passing years have wit-
nessed the decline of any test for court review based on the degree of
discretion exercised by the administrative agency.
The second quotation sprang from intense feeling against a new
philosophy of government which may be characterized as planned con-
trol by experts. 2 It was prompted by the feeling that the eager
assumption of independence by the administrative was based upon a
scornful disregard of restraints thought to be outmoded. It was occa-
sioned by a questionable discretionary act of an administrative body,
arising in the course of the application of a rule of practice designed
empirically to meet a particular problem of administration. It implies
an attitude of restraint against interference with legal rights and privi-
leges, and a desire to balance the distribution of governmental power.
There is a place for both the administrative and the judiciary.
Between them must be distributed the work which each is best suited
to do. It lies with the administrative to serve, regulate, and control the
citizens, in accordance with the mandates of their legislative represen-
121 Blachly and Atman, op. cit. supra, p. 75; R. E. Cushman, The Problem of the
Independent Regulatory Commissions, and Judicial Review of the Regulatory
Commissions, REPORT OF THE COMMrITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT,
op. cit. supra, p. 219.
122 The final determination of large policy is in the direct representatives of the
public. F. FRANKFURTER, DEMOCRACY AND THE EXPERT, supra, note 3, p. 659.
13 For difficulties which arise when there is an absence of clear legislative
standards see T. C. BLAISDELL, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1932) p. 290.
124 Described as administrative absolutism by some observers, see Roscoe Pound,
Some Implications of Recent Legislation (1938) 5 VrrAL SPEECHES OF THE
DAY 90.
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tatives, with all the abilities which it can command. It becomes the
function of the courts to guarantee the application of constitutional
principles and general rules of law-to insure, in other words, the
application of a judicial attitude in the administration of government.
"In the latter's keeping are precious ultimate interests; but
not less so are those entrusted to the administrative by legisla-
tures. In humble realization by each of their respective func-
tions lies in large measure the trembling hope for the mainte-
nance of our democracy.'
25
125 Felix Frankfurter, Foreword (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 515.
